I enjoy reflecting on the views of those who are in worldview opposition to myself, which is the rationale for this post.

I will briefly reflect on the hypothesis forwarded by the German philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872) that religion is “projection”. I find value in Feuerbach’s view, and I will attempt to apply it to a real-life example.

The Basic Hypothesis

Feuerbach posited that religion is a “projection” of ideal human values into the cosmos “out there”. In other words, religion is nothing more than a human projection or abstraction into the cosmos of ideas that have purely human origins.

It is the projection of the best qualities found within human nature, which could have psychological, social, economic, or political origins. Feuerbach accepts that there is an “essence” to religion, but unlike some other thinkers, he saw this essence as being unreal and fictional. God is not “out there” as an existing agent; rather, humans have invented the illusion of God and projected it into the cosmos.

In its essence, religion is deceptive, fallacious, delusional, and unreal, as opposed to being factual. Feuerbach proposed that humanity’s obsession with religious imaginings is because he is divided against himself or alienated from his own true being.

The Value of Feuerbach’s Hypothesis

Feuerbach’s hypothesis is not a popular one among religious believers. Some readers will also no doubt wonder why one might see value in it. I believe Feuerbach’s hypothesis is an important one in the critical theory of religion for at least two reasons. First, it influenced other significant thinkers such as Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud, who also presented projectionist theories of religion and who both deserve to be taken seriously. Second, because it speaks to a real feature of religion, at least as religion is embraced by some people.

I focus specifically on the second point. Like with most of the fascinating theories presented in the critical study of religion, one should be hesitant to extrapolate Feuerbach’s hypothesis to a universal scale as if to treat it as applicable to all religions.

In the study of religion, it is very difficult to view just a definition, let alone a theory, as sufficient enough to encompass all the world’s religions and their countless doctrinal varieties and members. This is a continued struggle in scholarship where variety continues to undermine definitional efforts. Some have proposed that we throw away the term “religion” altogether, but most are unwilling to go that far.

To return to the second point, one should avoid giving others the impression that scholars cannot say anything about religion from the critical theory of religion. On the contrary, there is much value to be derived from the various theories.

Feuerbach’s value lies in its limited, rather than universal, applicability. Religion means many things to countless people. It can be about what sociologist Christian Smith refers to as “secondary products,” such as explanation, meaning, identity, solidarity, control, representations, and rewards. Religion can be about community, relationships, hope, the need to overcome trials and struggles, and even the belief that one has received a divine revelation or undergone some mystical experience.

One can place Feuerbach in this context: religion is also about projection. Projection is a historical and contemporary feature of religion and religious life.

Examples of the Projection Hypothesis

Consider the doctrine(s) of heaven as it is for some believers in the West, for whom it seems to be a projection of ideal human values: humans on Earth struggle with death, so in heaven they are conceptualized as immortal; humans struggle with sickness and disease, so heaven is existence without sickness; most humans hate evil, so heaven is the domain of good; humans desire a figure of ultimate justice, so at the center of heaven there is God who is supremely just. For some people, at least, an argument could be made that heaven is a projection of ideal human values.

The Islamic concept of Paradise, Jannah, is a good example. In the context of an Arabian desert environment, the furnace out of which Islam emerged, would a person living in the harsh climate not look forward to a heaven in which there are “dates and pomegranates” (Qur’an 55:68), an “abundance of fruit” (43:71, 73), and gardens bursting with a constant flow of water (3:136; 13:35; 15:45; 22:23)?

This heaven has lush gardens, shady valleys, fountains, and rivers of milk, water, and honey, most of which cannot be found in or around Mecca and Medina. It is not difficult to notice how the early Muslims would have produced such an idea in their unforgiving context of seventh-century Arabia.

On a more personal note, I remember speaking with a lonely elderly woman who went through life with great struggle: she had little support in the way of family, almost no financial income, no car to get around, and she sometimes lived in shelters or, if she was lucky, she could find accommodation through some compassionate individual. Life was clearly tough for this unfortunate woman.

I learned that she looked forward to the Second Coming of Christ, a topic she mentioned several times, which she claimed would happen in exactly three years’ time (this expected arrival did not happen as the final months of 2023 are now four years later since she made that prophetic claim). This was real for her, and it was an authentic hope waiting to be fulfilled. But from an outsider perspective, Jesus Christ, as conceptualized in this scenario, is a symbol on which this elderly woman projected her personal and abstract desires and hopes.

One begins to wonder why a person of such advanced and mature age in such undesirable circumstances would not want the Promised Messiah to come very soon with the angels in the clouds of heaven.

Who does not wish and hope to be removed from an existence of existential and experiential struggle to a transcendent, non-earthly location where such struggles no longer exist?

Feuerbach theorized about these types of things. Like Marx would later, Feuerbach criticized the religious for wasting their efforts by focusing on the transcendent, supernatural, and God rather than on practical objectives. He believed that focusing here diverted much-needed energy away from other important areas, such as improving one’s own social and economic conditions.

In other words, rather than placing her hope in the Second Coming of Christ and overemphasizing this, the woman should channel her energies into seeking employment and social relationships to help her through her socio-economic struggles. It is only this that will assist her in the here and now, and not, according to Feuerbach, some religious “illusion”.

Perhaps supporting Feuerbach’s hypothesis is that religion is the manifestation of humanity’s general inability to live peaceably with the discomfort brought on by mundane, earthly existence. Empirical data suggests suggest that people overwhelmingly approach religion as a means to overcome earthly trials, making religion geared more towards practical than spiritual concerns.

In conclusion, Feuerbach’s hypothesis does boast some value in the study of religion. It makes sense of real-life examples. One might conclude such a reflection with a caveat: just because projection is a real feature of religion, this is not to assert, as some would, ontological claims about religious beliefs themselves, which would be going too far with the data.